





Ten Models of Consciousness 
That Are None
Abstract
Ten models of consciousness are discussed. The models are proposed by individuals who 
do not seem to understand “the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness”, presumably 
because they have no qualia themselves. As the Zombie’s proposals are dismissed, the qual-
ity of their comments and contributions rises. It is concluded that no premature solution to 
the hard problem should be proposed at this point; instead it is suggested that the problem 
must first be appreciated to full extent by scientists and students of all faculties dealing with 
information processing in the human brain. Ultimately, the question is why the brain, when 
in a particular state, experiences its own activity qualitatively. The answer to that question 








































pens	 (by	 really,	 I	 mean,	 objectively,	 physically)	 is	 that	 a	 photoreceptor	 in	
the	retina	responds	to	the	wavelength	of	about	650	nm,	generates	electrical	
impulses	that	are	forwarded	to	the	visual	cortex	where	neurons	are	activated,	
which	 in	 turn	 activate	 further	neurons	 and	 these	 further	neurons	 etc.,	 until	









need,	 first,	 to	make	a	behavioural	distinction	between	 the	 two	 tomatoes	 in	
order	to	behave	perfectly	adaptively,	and	secondly,	to	describe	the	underlying	
processes	with	 scientific	means.	We	need	no	other	variables	 than	 the	ones	
sketched	here	(measurable,	definable	entities	and	forces)	to	causally	explain	
the	 behaviour	 and	 the	 mediating	 neuronal	 processes.	We	 need	 not	 refer	 to	
“green”	or	“red”	or	other	entities	which	exist	only	subjectively.	These	quali-
ties	 seem	 theoretically	 redundant	 (not	necessary	 to	 explain	behaviour)	 and	
empirically	not	existent	(not	observable).
Now	Zombies,	take	it	away!
Zombie	1,	probably	a	molecular	biologist,	asks: I don’t see the problem or why 
it is hard. In fact, I get annoyed when people argue about consciousness. Don’t 
they have anything better to do, run a couple of carefully designed experiments 
for instance? They would be welcome in my lab! There we don’t talk much 





subjective.	 It	 cannot	be	observed	or	measured,	neither	with	 self-report	nor	
with	neuroimaging	or	intracranial	recordings	of	any	sort.	What	can	be	meas-


































Zombie	2,	and	elderly	person,	scratches	his	long	white	beard	and	asks: I think 
you have a very simplistic, if not naïve, understanding of science and reality. 
We all know that science can never bring out the objective truth! Everything 
we appear to have “discovered” is only constructed in our senses and minds, 
and is therefore utterly subjective anyway. Marx has already noticed that, 
alongside a number of influential philosophers who no one in this fast modern 
world ever seems to read or listen to or communicate with… The mistake you 
are making is believing in the objective existence of an outside world!
All	that	I	am	assuming	is	that	nature	and	the	universe	still	existed	even	if	hu-
mans	didn’t,	meaning,	if	an	asteroid	crashed	down	onto	the	earth	and	wiped	
out	all	human	existence,	 there	would	still	be	a	universe	 left	 that	exists	and	













Zombie	3,	a	friend	of	Zombie	1,	jumps	in	and	says:	Yeah, I don’t like that sort 
of crap either. Let’s stick to the facts. Every student of Psychology learns in 
their first semester that we need to define a concept in operational (objective) 
terms before we can investigate and explain it. But for consciousness, I think 
Daniel Dennett (1991) has already done that! It has to do with self-reflection 





came along and even described the neural underpinnings of it, it’s a receptor 
called NMDA. When this receptor is activated, the brain forms metarepre-
sentations that encode or monitor the presence of simpler neuronal processes 
















The	problem	 is	 that	 there	 is	a	 fundamental	difference	between,	on	 the	one	












It	 follows	 that	qualities	 appear	 redundant	 in	 terms	of	natural	 selection	and	
evolution.	All	that	helps	for	survival,	and	all	that	natural	selection	can	oper-
ate	on,	 are	 features	and	 functions	 that	 are	observable	 (i.e.,	 the	phenotype).	
Subjective	qualities	are	not	of	that	nature,	they	do	not	interact	with	anything	
physical	and	therefore	seem	pointless.
Zombie	4:	Wait a minute. There is no need to become dualistic. If phenomenal 
experience has no behavioural function – that does not mean the qualities are 
not existent. Many cognitive functions are latent and do not manifest them-
selves in behaviour. Maybe these are simply epiphenomena!


















by	changing	my	neuronal	 activity,	 e.g.,	 I	 can	guarantee	 that	my	subjective	















says:	I have no idea what you are talking about. Of course qualities have a 
behavioural function! It is only because of the redness that the ripe tomato 
appears attractive to me, it is what motivates me to eat it. I reject the green 
tomato because the colour signals to me that it is not ripe. I withdraw from 
something that hurts and I approach something that feels good. I would not 
have any motivation to do so (and hence would not be able to survive) if I did 
not experience these qualities! They tell me what to do and what not!










up	 to	do	 so.	The	wiring	of	your	 system	 is	very	complex	and	very	 flexible	
and	 state-dependent	 (e.g.,	 you’d	 probably	 behave	 differently	 if	 your	 blood	
sugar	 levels	 were	 high	 enough	 or	 if	 the	 650	 nm	 reflecting	 tomato	 was	 in	
another	person’s	possession	who	you	do	not	want	to	get	into	a	fight	with).	It	
is	 the	result	of	a	 long	phylogenetic	and	ontogenetic	 learning	history.	Many	
people	(and	cognitive	psychologists,	especially	those	ignorant	to	behavioral	
ethology)	do	not	seem	to	be	able	to	imagine	that	this	level	of	complexity	can	
be	entirely	 the	product	of	natural	 evolution,	without	 any	extra	 ingredients.	
These	people	usually	refer	to	emergent	properties	of	a	system,	thereby	mysti-
fying	what	needs	to	be	causally	explained,	and	disregarding	the	fact	that	these	









Zombie	6:	You cannot apply the same logic to all species. Humans are not 
passive observers of their evolution, they actively shape their genetic makeup 
and the environment in which they live in with their technological, cultural, 
and scientific achievements, much unlike any other animal. This would not 
have been possible without consciousness. We need consciousness to be able 
to reason and think and solve problems, which are ultimately human capabili-
ties.	
It	is	true	that	humans	are	shaping	evolution.	But	I	don’t	see	how	this	can	have	
anything	 to	do	with	 subjective	qualities.	What	 is	 it	 about	 even	 the	highest	









neighbour’s	 cat,	 which	 is	 clearly	 unable	 to	 reason	 much,	 be	 unable	 to	 see	
colours?	And	what	about	newborn	babies	–	they	cry	from	pain,	but	can	they	
solve	problems?
Zombie	7,	a	neurobiologist	 recording	 in vivo	 from	the	visual	system,	says:	
There are colour neurons in V4. When the right ones fire, you see red, when 
others fire, you see green (it is a bit more complicated than that, but I do not 
want to challenge you). The firing of those neurons IS red or green. Therefore, 
your question what difference a neural process with colour perception should 
make to subsequent processing relative to one without colour perception does 















Zombie	8:	Why do we keep talking of colours and pain. Why not talk of emo-
tions? Fear, happiness etc, the stuff that makes life worthwhile living? The 
stuff that makes you know what you like or not? You have got the function of 















Researchers	 like	Damasio	 (1999)	claim	that	 they	 investigate	 the	subjective	



















Zombie	9	is	becoming	impatient	and	says:	It is clearly a mistake to look at 
emotions or colours and other processes within the individual brain when 
you want to understand consciousness. Have you never heard of Wolf Singer 
(1998)? He has said a long time ago (e.g., in a talk he gave 1998 at the ASSC 
conference in Bremen, Germany), that he does not understand why is it so 
hard to see that phenomenal experience emerges as a cultural phenomenon! It 
emerges when many brains come together and communicate with each other. 
That means, you cannot explain consciousness from the individual brain! The 
sum is so much more than the parts, you reductionists, as new properties 
















Zombie	10:	Heyheyhey, relax. I don’t think we need to go up to the sociological 





cal laboratory doing research on pain. And I must say, of course we measure 
the subjective quality of pain. We use electroencephalography (EEG), electro-
dermal activity (EDA), diaries, questionnaires, behavioural indices such as 
the cold pressor test and many other experimental techniques. We can indeed 
tell you something about the subjective side of this quality pain. We find that it 
has an affective component: it can be bothering you or putting you in despair; 
it has a sensory component: it can feel tickly or stingy or sharp or pinchy; and 








Zombie	10:	But that makes no sense. Why should it be wired up so that the 






Zombies	5,	7,	&	8:	But could the motivation for behavioural tendencies like 
approach and withdrawal not perhaps be amplified or augmented or sharp-





neural	 implementation,	 it	 can	exert	 its	effects	onto	 the	system	without	any	
qualities.
Zombie	11:	Well then maybe the qualities cannot be explained. They are sim-
ply there, like Chalmers (1995) says. They like extra ingredients which can-
not be reduced further, just like other fundamental entities in physics such 
as mass, space, time, and electrical charge. I think that solves the problem. 



















Zombie	12:	But if the physicists are ignoring the qualities, they are missing 
out on something, something real! What they wouldn’t consider is what it is 
like to be that piece of matter called the brain. I suggest that qualia is the 
first-person perspective onto that physical phenomenon, while physicists ob-
serve and describe only the third-person-perspective of this system. If the two 
perspectives refer to the same phenomenon, then any explanation you give for 
the one must also hold for the other – you only need to change the perspec-
tive. In light of this view, people are actually right when, instead of referring 
to evolution and ontogeny and the wiring of their neuronal system, they say “I 
am grasping the red tomato because it looks as if were ripe and tasted good”. 
It is the first-person language for: “My sensorimotor neuronal networks are 
wired up such that in the case of low blood sugar they make my hand reach 
out for the round-shaped object reflecting wavelengths of 650 nm, in anticipa-
tion of digestible food”. Both describe processes that guide the behavior that 
will, incidentally, increase chances of survival. That way, you can describe 
anything either in scientific terms or in subjective terms, it is still the same 
thing, and nothing is missing, and there is no problem anymore. (This	one	is	
probably	not	a	Zombie.)
I	agree	that	this	view	resolves	many	of	the	questions	we	discussed,	including	
why	qualia	 are	not	measurable	 from	 the	 third	person’s	viewpoint	 although	
they	do	exist	and	what	functions	they	might	have	(the	answer	is:	they	are	in	
fact	measurable,	namely	as	neuronal	activity	patterns,	with	the	same	causes	









implements	 focused	attention.	Maybe	 this	 focal	attention	allows	 for	global	
control	(Chalmers,	1995),	metarepresentation	(Flohr,	1996),	or	feature	bind-
ing	 (Crick	 and	 Koch,	 1990).	 However,	 whatever	 the	 process,	 it	 cannot	 be	
based	on	any	physical	matter,	let	alone	any	“information”	(Chalmers,	1995),	
as	 information	 (or	 function)	 is	not	 a	natural	 entity	which	 impacts	onto	 the	
physical	world	per se	but	something	that	exists	only	when	it	is	“read	out”	by	
someone.
All	Zombies:	So where do we go from here?
I	honestly	don’t	know	where	we	should	go.	I	don’t	even	have	the	slightest	
idea	where	the	next	relevant	impulse	will	come	from,	if	any,	whether	from	
neurosciences	 or	 physics	 or	 philosophy,	 and	 in	 what	 form.	What	 has	 been	




































with	 an	 invocation	of	 the	mystery	of	 the	phenomenon,	 and	becomes	more	
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In diesem Beitrag werden zehn Bewusstseinsmodelle diskutiert. Vorgeschlagen werden sie von 
Individuen, die offensichtlich das „schwierige Problem des phänomenalen Bewusstseins” nicht 
verstehen, vielleicht aus Ermangelung an eigener Qualia. Die Vorschläge werden einer nach dem 
anderen verworfen; unterdessen steigt die Qualität der Kommentare. Die Schlussfolgerung aus 
der Diskussion ist, dass momentan keine endgültige Lösung für das Problem in Sicht ist. Stattdes-
sen wird angeregt, das Problem zunächst im vollen Umfang Wissenschaftlern und Studenten aller 
Fakultäten näher zu bringen, die sich mit Informationsverarbeitung im menschlichen Gehirn 
befassen. Die entscheidende Frage ist letztlich, warum das in einem bestimmten physikalischen 
Zustand befindliche Gehirn seine eigene Aktivität qualitativ erlebt. Die erfolgreiche Beantwor-
tung dieser Frage erfordert vermutlich die Erweiterung der Ontologie der Physik.
Schlüsselbegriffe
Phänomenales	 Bewusstsein,	 Qualia,	 Zombie,	 Neurowissenschaft,	 Physikalismus,	 Philosophie	 des	
Geistes
Sabine Windmann
Dix modèles de conscience 
qui ne le sont pas
Résumé
Dix modèles de conscience sont discutés. Les modèles en question sont proposés par des in-
dividus ne semblant pas comprendre « le problème difficile de la conscience phénoménale », 
vraisemblablement parce qu’ils n’ont pas de qualia eux-mêmes. Alors que les demandes des 
Zombies sont rejetées, la qualité de leurs commentaires et de leurs contributions augmente. 
La conclusion est qu’aucune solution précoce ne devrait être proposée à ce stade. Plutôt, il est 
suggéré que le problème devrait d’abord être pleinement examiné par les scientifiques et les 
étudiants de toutes les universités concernées par le traitement de l’information dans le cerveau 
humain. Enfin, reste la question pourquoi le cerveau, lorsqu’il est dans un état particulier, vit sa 
propre activité de façon qualitative. La réponse à cette question contribuera probablement au 
développement de l’actuelle ontologie de la physique.
Mots-clés
conscience	phénoménale,	qualia,	zombie,	neuroscience,	physicalisme,	philosophie	de	l’esprit
